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INTRODUCTION: 
SYMPOSIUM ON PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 
REAL WORLD 
MATTHEW LISTER* 
The rule of law is an example of what has been called an “essentially 
contested concept.” These are concepts where the conditions of their proper 
application are subject to deep, arguably intractable, dispute among people who 
are otherwise able to apply the terms.1 A wide number of authors have offered 
accounts of the rule of law, and yet none have been able to garner general 
support.2 This might make us worry about the usefulness of further work on the 
topic. However, as shown in the papers making up this book symposium, Paul 
Gowder, in his recent book, The Rule of Law in the Real World, offers us both a 
novel account of the rule of law and a fruitful application of the account. While 
each of the commenters take issue with one or another aspect of Gowder’s 
account, all agree that it makes a significant contribution to our understanding 
of the rule of law and offers fresh insight for further analysis. In what follows I 
will briefly set out the core elements of Gowder’s account and then note the 
primary issues or questions raised by the contributors to the symposium. 
Gowder contends that the rule of law is made up, at its core, of three notions: 
regularity, publicity, and generality.3 Regularity implies that the power of the 
state must always and only be used when this is authorized by good faith 
interpretations of existing, specific rules. Publicity demands that the rules that 
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 1. For a helpful introduction to the idea of “essentially contested concepts,” and further 
citations, see Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 028: Concepts and Conceptions, http://lso 
lum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_theory_le_1.html [https://perma.cc/2VT4-4 
D2S] (last updated June 12, 2016). 
 2. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW & NATURAL RIGHTS 270–90 (Paul Craig ed., 2d 
ed. 2011); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 30–94 (rev. ed. 1969); DAVID LYONS, ETHICS 
AND THE RULE OF LAW (1984); Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law as a Theater of Debate, in 
ARGUING ABOUT LAW 212–28 (Aileen Kavanagh & John Oberdiek eds., 2009); Colleen Murphy, 
Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law, 24 LAW & PHIL. 239 (2005); Robin West, Re-
Imagining Justice: Progressive Interpretations of Formal Equality, Rights, and the Rule of Law, 
Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 12-074 (2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2083806 
[https://perma.cc/2TV8-H4U8]. 
 3. The information in this paragraph and the next two paragraphs is supported in PAUL 
GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD (2016). 
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guide official behavior are accessible to the general public. Together, these two 
ideas form the “weak” version or account of the rule of law. A state that meets 
these requirements will be better than one that does not in that it will typically 
refrain from treating its subjects with hubris—behaving as if its officials were 
superior to those ruled—and from subjecting the citizens to terror—making the 
citizens fear the power of the state and behave submissively to it. 
To move from the weak to the full or strong version of the rule of law, we 
must introduce the notion of generality. This requires not only the substantial 
fulfillment of the principles of regularity and publicity, but also that no irrelevant 
or arbitrary distinctions are drawn between individuals. This, Gowder contends, 
leads us away from a merely formal to a substantial notion of the rule of law. 
This in turn implies that legal distinctions must be backed by “public reasons”—
the reasons for applying a law to a particular person must be such that they could, 
at least in principle, count as reasons to the person being subjected to the law. 
Gowder derives important substantial conclusions from these claims. The 
rule of law, he argues, does not, as many have claimed, require any particular 
set of social institutions, but can be instantiated in as diverse institutions as the 
mass juries of ancient Athens, or the informal norms of the British parliamentary 
system, as well as the more commonly discussed U.S. system of a written 
constitution and independent courts with the power of judicial review. 
Furthermore, the rule of law is a scaler or comparative notion on this account—
it does not apply in an “all or nothing” way, but in a “more or less” way. This 
substantial notion of the rule of law allows citizens to see themselves as social 
equals, and provides a way for them to coordinate so as to ensure that the 
powerful within society do not use the power of the state merely to enrich and 
empower themselves. 
All of the contributors to the book symposium agree that Gowder has 
provided a highly insightful and important account, but each take issue with 
different aspects of the argument. Colleen Murphy, in her contribution, starts by 
raising two questions in relation to Gowder’s generality requirement: first, can 
generality ground the degree of equality that Gowder desires, and secondly, does 
generality imply a closer connection to liberal democracy than Gowder 
suggests.4 Murphy worries that it is more controversial than Gowder suggests to 
say that the generality principle implies an egalitarian condition. If this is so, 
more substantive argument may be needed for the egalitarian aspects of the rule 
of law, making it more controversial. On the other hand, Murphy worries that 
the rule of law may be less adaptable to nondemocratic forms of government 
than Gowder suggests, especially if we include a significant egalitarian element. 
Won’t those excluded from participating in government, Murphy asks, see 
themselves as treated as less than equals? If so, then there may be a conflict 
 
 4. The information in this paragraph is supported in Colleen Murphy, The Rule of Law, 
Democracy, and Obedience to Law, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293 (2018). 
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between Gowder’s egalitarian generality condition and his claim that the rule of 
law has only indirect connections with democracy. Finally, Murphy raises 
concerns about Gowder’s account of the relationship between the rule of law 
and a duty on the part of citizens to obey the law. On Gowder’s account, the rule 
of law is primarily a constraint on rulers or authorities. However, Murphy 
argues, a full account of the role of law needs to account not only for constraint 
on officials, but the role of citizens in respecting and obeying the law, for both 
aspects are needed if society is to be ruled by law. 
Robin West agrees that Gowder’s substantive generality account, with its 
strong egalitarian implications, is revisionary, but finds the account attractive 
for that reason.5 While more formal accounts of the rule of law have tended to 
be highly conservative, arguably making attempts to deal with significant 
inequality problematic, Gowder’s account, she notes, provides grounds for 
addressing inequality. West worries, however, that while Gowder had provided 
a strong conceptual argument this may not line up well with the way that the 
idea of the rule of law has functioned and developed over time. In a related 
worry, West questions whether Gowder’s equality concern is properly tied to the 
notion of generality at all. Why not apply equality principles directly? If it is 
equality that matters, trying to get there through generality is likely to lead us 
astray, she argues. 
West next raises a concern about how private power is dealt with in 
Gowder’s account. Many types of harms done to individuals, West notes, are 
not perpetuated by the state, but rather by private individuals. Is this an offense 
against the rule of law? On Gowder’s account, she contends, it is hard to see 
how it would be, since the rule of law serves primarily to restrain officials. 
However, if we see the rule of law as imposing positive obligations on the state 
to protect its citizens from arbitrary and discriminatory uses of power, whatever 
their source, we can see the lack of protection for some citizens by the state as 
itself a violation of the rule of law. If this is correct, West argues, then the rule 
of law may impose more positive obligations on the state than Gowder 
countenances. 
Chad Flanders starts his critique by noting that Gowder’s account of the rule 
of law is more substantial than most, and asks if this is a virtue.6 There is reason 
to favor a simple account, one that fits more closely with what Gowder calls the 
“weak” version of the rule of law, Flanders argues. The “simple” account stops 
with regularity and publicity, and does not include generality. This is a virtue, 
Flanders argues, because accounts of generality will almost inevitably be 
 
 5. The information in this paragraph and the next paragraph is supported in Robin West, Paul 
Gowder’s Rule of Law, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303 (2018). 
 6. The information in this paragraph and the next paragraph is supported in Chad Flanders, 
Keeping the Rule of Law Simple: Comments on Gowder, The Rule of Law in the Real World, 62 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 313 (2018). 
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controversial, making it much harder to know whether the rule of law applies or 
not. And, if we want to be able to use claims about the rule of law to make 
judgments about the behavior of states, it will be useful if there is agreement. 
Flanders worries that, by including generality—and with it equality—in the rule 
of law, that Gowder is trying to make the concept do more work than it can bear. 
This is not to doubt that generality and equality are good things, but simply to 
question whether they are properly part of the rule of law. 
Flanders next provides pressure on Gowder’s account by raising two issues 
not significantly discussed in the book: mass incarceration and immigration. 
Both issues seem to pose problems for the rule of law, but exactly how to fit 
them into the account is problematic. In both cases, we are faced with policies 
that seem to have much that could be said against them, but it is unclear how 
they connect with the rule of law. It is not implausible that there are problems in 
a society that imprisons as many people as the United States does, and that seems 
to allow arbitrary features of people to be relevant to immigration decisions. But, 
can the rule of law help us here? As Flanders points out, in both cases, we might 
worry that a more consistent—that is, a more regular—application of the law 
would lead to worse overall policy, with more imprisonment and more 
deportations. Both cases raise worries, then, about the normative work that can 
be done by the rule of law. 
Matthew Lister, in his contribution, picks up the question of immigration 
again, and asks whether the rule of law can exist “at the border.”7 Lister notes 
that, traditionally, regulation of borders and admission to countries have been 
treated as largely law-free zones, ones where nearly unbound legal and 
administrative discretion has been the rule. The border is not only an unusually 
lawless zone, Lister claims, but one that would seem to pose a particular problem 
for Gowder’s account. On Gowder’s account, the rule of law is instituted when 
“members of a political community” or “citizens” are able to coordinate together 
to constrain the actions of officials or powerful elites. But, state action at the 
border involves the use of power against people who are not citizens and often 
not even members of the society using the power. Does this imply that, on 
Gowder’s account, the rule of law cannot apply at the border? 
Lister argues that, on Gowder’s account, there are two ways in which we 
might try to extend the rule of law to the border. The first is to look at concrete 
connections that current citizens or members of the political community have 
with noncitizens. Just as the interests of current citizens give them strong reasons 
to coordinate to establish the rule of law in their own community, so may the 
interests of current members in connections with nonmembers give them reason 
to work to extend the rule of law to the border. These interests can include family 
 
 7. The information in this paragraph is supported in Matthew Lister, Can the Rule of Law 
Apply at the Border? A Commentary on Paul Gowder’s The Rule of Law in the Real World, 62 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J 323 (2018). 
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ties, other forms of personal relationships, offers of employment, intellectual 
connections, and others. Some of these connections already serve to give greater 
legal protections, including protections from arbitrary decision-making, to some 
noncitizens, and the general trend, Lister argues, can and should be further 
strengthened. 
The second method for extending the rule of law to the border involves 
appealing to certain universal norms so as to build a sense of community that 
stretches beyond borders. While these norms are not as robust or well established 
as domestic law, and therefore are unlikely to extend all of the protections of the 
rule of law to all people at the border, they can, Lister argues, be a basis for 
working against the worst arbitrary actions by border officials. Lister finishes 
his contribution by considering the vexed dispute about providing “amnesty” for 
unauthorized immigrants in the United States and other countries. He argues that 
Gowder’s account of the amnesty provided to supporters of the oligarchic coups 
in ancient Athens provides a model for thinking about when and how amnesties 
for unauthorized migrants can be done without offending the rule of law, thereby 
making them more palatable to current citizens. 
The symposium ends with Gowder’s replies and responses to the 
commenters. Despite the remaining disagreement between Gowder and the 
commenters, it is clear that the book has made major theoretical and practical 
advances in our understanding of the rule of law, and will pay careful study. 
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